

RETHINKING A PROFESSIONAL RIVALRY: EARLY EPICUREANS AGAINST THE STOA

In the history of ancient Greek philosophy the Epicureans and the Stoics have been considered bitter professional rivals. My aim in the present paper is to explore the Epicurean side of this rivalry in the early days in the history of the two schools, that is, a time when both the Garden and the Stoa were striving to establish themselves in the philosophical arena of the Hellenistic era. There are two (at least) reasons why, I think, this is a worthwhile cause. First, the existence of a controversy between the two schools seems to be either simply taken for granted¹ or passed over in silence; hence little attention has so far been dedicated to the exact terms of this controversy (if there was any) and the issues at stake quite generally. Second, a closer examination of the early Epicurean reception of and reaction to the Stoa may throw additional light on the dynamics that shaped the philosophical climate at the beginning of Hellenistic times and help us assess the position of the Epicurean school in it. In what follows I collect and review the extant evidence of anti-Stoic criticism by the early Epicureans; the principal questions I am concerned with are: a) how extensive the Epicurean critique against the Stoics appears to have been, b) what the main points of controversy were and, c) what these tell us about the Epicurean perception of and attitude towards the Stoa.

Before I turn to the main part of my paper, a clarification of terminology and chronology is necessary. By the phrase ‘early Epicureans’ I refer collectively to Epicurus and his immediate followers, namely, all those eminent Epicureans for whom we know (or have good reasons to assume) that they had been direct students of Epicurus and had played an active role in the first Epicurean community in Lampsacus and then in Athens. The most important early Epicureans whose writings we know through papyri fragments and secondary sources are Metrodorus, Polyaenus, Hermarchus, Colotes, Idomeneus, Carneiscus and Polystratus.² Thus the period on which my examination here primarily focusses extends roughly from the end of the fourth century B.C., when the Epicurean school was established, until

¹ See K. Kleve, ‘The philosophical polemics in Lucretius’, in O. Gigon (ed.), *Lucretius*, Fondation Hardt, vol. 24 (Geneva, 1978), 39–71; H. Jones, *The Epicurean Tradition* (London and New York, 1989) at 85, 88, and 92; A. Tepedino Guerra, *Polieno. Frammenti*, La Scuola di Epicuro 11, (Napoli, 1991) at 38 speaks about the ‘fervour’ of the Epicurean polemics against the rival schools and particularly against the Stoics; see also E.A. Mendez and A. Angeli, *Filodemo. Testimonianze su Socrate*, La Scuola di Epicuro 13 (Napoli, 1992) at 82.

² The first three together with Epicurus were considered as great men and founding figures of the Epicurean school, known as *kathēgēmones*. For the last two we cannot be sure whether they had actually been direct students of Epicurus himself; yet one could still count them among the eminent ‘early’ Epicureans as borderline cases; after all, their writings, fragments of which are preserved in the Herculanean papyri, are among the earliest specimens of Epicurean literature. For Carneiscus, see M. Capasso, *Carneisco. Il secondo libro del Filista* (P.Herc. 1027), La Scuola di Epicuro 10 (Napoli, 1988); for Polystratus, see G. Indelli, *Polistrato. Sul disprezzo irrazionale delle opinioni popolari*, La Scuola di Epicuro 2 (Napoli, 1978) and M. Capasso, ‘Polistrato uditore di Epicuro?’, *CErc* 12 (1982), 5–12.

the late third century B.C., when the youngest of Epicurus' first followers were presumably still operating.

I. PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM IN THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL

According to the picture conveyed mainly through secondary sources (that is, the biographical and doxographical tradition), the philosophical activity of Hellenistic times³ seems to have been marked by vigorous debates between the various schools, old and new, that dominated the scene from the late fourth/early third century B.C. and until the turn of the millennium.⁴ One may be sceptical about the accuracy of this picture, which derives from later sources and so may reflect the perception later authors had of the philosophical sects of the past. Yet it is not implausible to assume that inter-school controversies may have gradually started playing an important role in the agenda of at least some of the schools in the Hellenistic era. After all, this was a time when the philosophy schools were (for the most part) turning into more formalized institutions: they had a leading figure as their head, a specific location as their base, a given organization, and even property that was bequeathed to the successors.⁵ Hence it is not difficult to imagine that, as the identity of each school was crystallizing, the sense of allegiance to it would grow stronger and each school's adherents would try to define themselves against professional rivals. And one way of doing so would be by criticizing one's opponents.⁶

It seems that within the Garden in particular criticizing rival philosophers acquired paramount importance. Already in antiquity Epicurus and his students

³ For a discussion of 'Hellenistic philosophy' as a period in the history of ancient philosophy see M. Isnardi Parente, 'La genesi del concetto di filosofia ellenistica' in id., *Filosofia e scienza nel pensiero ellenistico* (Napoli, 1991), 289–323; H. Flashar and W. Görler, 'Die hellenistische Philosophie im allgemeinen', in H. Flashar (ed.), *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike*, Band 4: Die Hellenistische Philosophie (Basel and Stuttgart, 1994), 3–9; M. Frede, 'Epilogue', in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld and M. Schofield (edd.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1999), 771–97; see also the *Preface* in Algra, Barnes, Mansfeld and Schofield (1999), xi–xix.

⁴ See D.N. Sedley, 'The protagonists', in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes (edd.), *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology* (Oxford, 1980), 1–17 for a lucid description of the philosophical climate and the debates and interactions among philosophers in the Hellenistic world.

⁵ It should be noted, though, that the development of a formal school around its founder and first leading figure must have been, as D.N. Sedley, 'The school, from Zeno to Arius Didymus', in B. Inwood (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (Cambridge, 2003), 7–32, at 13–14 argues, 'a gradual process' which may be crystallized only after the founder's death. On the form and the organization of the philosophical schools in Hellenistic times, see J.P. Lynch, *Aristotle's School: A Study of a Greek Educational Institution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972), 32–67 and 106–34; Flashar and Görler (n. 3); T. Dorandi, 'Chronology' and 'Organization and structure of the philosophical schools', in Algra, Barnes, Mansfeld, and Schofield (n. 3), 31–62. On the self-definition of Hellenistic schools by appeal to the authority of the founder, see D.N. Sedley, 'Philosophical allegiance in the Greco-Roman world', in J. Barnes and M. Griffin (edd.), *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society* (Oxford, 1989), 97–119.

⁶ For the important role of criticism and polemic in ancient philosophical discourse, see H. Baltussen, 'From polemic to exegesis: the ancient philosophical commentary', in J. Lavery (ed.), *Genres in Philosophy*, *Poetics Today* 28.2 (2007), 247–81. See also H. Baltussen, *Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator* (London, 2008) at 172–6.

gained the reputation of being the polemicists par excellence, although, perhaps, in an unjustifiably negative way: a series of ancient sources present Epicurus as a slanderer of his opponents.⁷ When one turns to extant testimonies and fragments of Epicurean writings, one realizes why the Epicurean school may have earned such a reputation: a large proportion of Epicurean literature appears to have been taken up by critical or polemical (though not necessarily slanderous) argumentation against various philosophical opponents.⁸ Epicurus and his immediate followers, but also later Epicureans, can all be seen to have engaged in criticism of rival philosophers and theories, whether in the form of self-contained and systematic polemics or within other, not primarily polemical treatises. So, for example, within the surviving fragments of Epicurus' *On Nature* we can find several samples of embedded criticism of various identifiable opponents: in Book 11 Epicurus appears to have attacked certain mathematicians/astronomers (quite possibly the school of Eudoxus of Cnidus at Cyzicus); at the end of Book 14 we find passages containing criticism against various Presocratic philosophers (including Democritus who is explicitly named), and against Plato (who is not named in the extant fragments but is easily identifiable from the content); in Book 25 a determinist theory of causation deriving from the Democritean tradition is targeted. Apart from the surviving critical passages of *On Nature* we also have references in secondary sources to what must have been self-contained polemical writings by Epicurus against the physicists (i.e. the Presocratic philosophers), against the Megarians, against Democritus and against Theophrastus: *Ἐπιτομή τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικοὺς* and *Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρικοὺς* in Diogenes Laertius 10.27–8, *Πρὸς Δημόκριτον* in Philodemus, *De*

⁷ See Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.93, Diog. Laert. 10.8. D.N. Sedley, 'Epicurus and his professional rivals', in J. Bollack and A. Laks (edd.), *Études sur l'Épicurisme antique*, Cahiers de Philologie 1, (Lille, 1976), 119–59 has shown that the picture of Epicurus as a ruthless detractor of his rivals, which emerges from certain ancient testimonies that are biased against Epicureanism (e.g. Cicero), is far from being an accurate one. According to Sedley (1976) at 148, Epicurus 'recognised many merits to his professional competitors, and was not ashamed to learn from them'. So Epicurus was not a slanderer, though he did engage in criticism of his rivals.

⁸ At this point it is necessary to make a conceptual clarification regarding the terms 'critical/criticism' and 'polemical/polemic' that will be used throughout my discussion here. According to the *OED* 'criticism' is the 'action of passing judgement upon the qualities or merits of anything; esp. the passing of unfavourable judgement', whereas 'polemic' is defined as 'a strong verbal or written attack on a person, opinion, doctrine etc'. Since an 'attack' on a person, opinion or doctrine cannot but involve unfavourable judgement, 'polemic' may be understood as a kind of 'criticism', stronger in tone and more aggressive than criticism *simpliciter*. However, 'polemic' should not be confused with 'invective', which can be defined as 'a violent attack in words', involves vituperative and abusive language, and hence is only destructive in aim. 'Polemic', and even more so 'criticism', can be constructive in the sense that they do not solely aim at demolishing the person, opinion or doctrine targeted, but raise points with a view to proposing or promoting a better alternative. For the purpose of my discussion here, I take the term 'criticism/critical' to refer generically to philosophical writings or passages from such writings that make a negative judgement about a rival philosopher and/or his theory, whether directly or indirectly, systematically or incidentally, in a mild or strong tone (in this sense, the term 'criticism' encompasses polemic). And I take the term 'polemic/polemical' to refer specifically to writings or passages that are a) openly and systematically critical or b) stronger and more aggressive (but *not* slanderous) in tone, or both. Of course, it should be noted that given the fragmentary nature of the evidence regarding Epicurean (and generally Hellenistic) texts it is very often difficult to judge on the basis of only a title or a few lines of scrappy context whether a certain writing or passage is polemical or not. In such cases, as a rule of thumb, I shall preferably use the generic 'criticism/critical' and reserve 'polemic/polemical' for writings and passages that appear to be involved in a systematic and direct attack against a philosophical opponent.

libertate dicendi fr. 20 (Olivieri) = [11] Arrighetti, *Πρὸς Θεόφραστον* in Plutarch's *Adversus Colotem* 1110C = [16] Arrighetti.⁹ Similarly, and despite the rather limited extant evidence, a considerable amount of the literary production of Epicurus' immediate followers appears to have been dedicated to polemic. So, in the case of Metrodorus, out of a sum of twenty-two titles transmitted, eight in all probability belong to writings that set out to criticize a given opponent: *Πρὸς τοὺς ἱατρούς*, *Πρὸς Τιμοκράτην*, *Πρὸς τοὺς διαλεκτικούς*, *Πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστάς*, *Πρὸς Δημόκριτον* (Diog. Laert. 10.22–4), *Πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος Γοργίαν* (preserved in Phld. *Ad contubernales* col. 11 Angeli), *Πρὸς τὸν Εὐθύφρονα Πλάτωνος* (preserved in an anonymous Epicurean writing in 1111 VH² col. 10 f. 201 = fr. 14 Körte and in Phld. *De pietate* I, col. 25, 702–5 Obbink = fr. 15 Körte), *Πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ φυσιολογίας λέγοντας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι ῥήτορας* (preserved in Phld. *Rhet. Lib.* II, col. XXVII = p. 101 Longo Auricchio). Polyaeus is also known to have written against professional rivals: *Πρὸς Ἀρίστωνα* (preserved in Phld. *De pietate* I, col. 1 Obbink = fr. 30 Tepedino Guerra) and *Πρὸς τὸ περὶ φιλοσοφίας Ἀριστοτέλους* (preserved in Phld. *De pietate* I, col. 38 Obbink) are the extant titles of two in all probability polemical writings. In the case of Hermarchus, the first scholarch of the Garden after Epicurus, three out of four extant titles must belong to polemical writings: *Πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα* (see fr. 27–34 Longo Auricchio), *Πρὸς Πλάτωνα* and *Πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην* (see Diog. Laert. 10.25). Hermarchus' successor in the headship of the school, Polystratus, is also mostly known through his polemic entitled *Περὶ τῆς ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως* (preserved in *P Herc.* 336 and 1150) in which he attacks the philosophers who doubt the reliability of common opinions. Colotes of Lampsacus too is notorious for his general polemic against nearly all the eminent philosophers up to Epicurus' day (*Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἔστιν*, the contents of which are known to us through Plutarch's *Adversus Colotem*). Finally, the remaining fragments from Philodemus and Demetrius Lacon present us with significant traces of criticism of rival philosophers.¹⁰

If philosophical criticism played so central a role in the literature produced by the Epicurean school, one would expect to find specimens of anti-Stoic attacks. In fact, since the Stoa was the other 'new' school of the day (as opposed to the traditional schools already existing), one imagines that it should have been counted among the prime contemporary targets for the Epicureans who were newcomers themselves and equally wanted to attract followers and gain authority. Now there are, indeed, many samples of anti-Stoic attacks by Epicureans; but these mostly concern the later part of the Hellenistic period (late second/early first century B.C.) and originate in later Epicureans such as Zeno of Sidon, Demetrius Lacon and

⁹ Titles of the type 'πρὸς + accusative' (where the accusative gives the name of a philosopher or school) may well be taken to suggest that the writing in question is polemical in the sense that it openly sets out to 'respond to' or refute the views of a rival philosopher. It is worth drawing a comparison here with rhetorical speeches that have 'πρὸς + accusative' titles (e.g. Demosthenes' *Πρὸς Λεπτίνην*). Now even if we accept that the surviving titles of ancient writings may not necessarily originate with the authors themselves but had been given by later editors, we can still draw inferences about the content of a book from its title: after all, we could assume that a later editor or commentator might have given a title that would reflect the content of the writing.

¹⁰ For a discussion of the role of polemics in the Epicurean school in particular see Kleve (n. 1).

Philodemus.¹¹ By contrast, a quick look at the extant evidence suggests that the specimens of early Epicurean critiques against the Stoics were surprisingly limited.¹² But is this really so, and why?

To answer this question one needs to turn to and scrutinize the remaining texts themselves, bearing in mind, of course, that the usual misfortunes of transmission may well be partly responsible for the apparently inconspicuous place of the Stoics in the picture of early Epicurean literature we have today.

II. THE STOICS IN EARLY EPICUREAN LITERATURE

The surviving evidence of anti-Stoic criticism by early Epicureans consists of either fragments of incomplete (or illegible) papyri or testimonies preserved in secondary sources and detached from their original background. As a result, in attempting to assess the Epicurean reaction to the Stoics there is a danger of reading too much, or too little, into this evidence. To avoid both pitfalls one may look through all the extant evidence relating to the early Epicurean school and isolate those passages which either a) make explicit reference to the Stoics, whether polemical¹³ or not, or b) do not explicitly mention the Stoics, but can give good indications that the opponents under discussion are the Stoics and their theories; such indications may be the reference to a 'trademark' Stoic thesis or the use of characteristically Stoic vocabulary, or even the overall context whenever this is available. It is with such considerations in mind that I here present a collection of those passages from early Epicurean texts that can relatively safely be taken to involve discussion or critique of Stoic opponents.

Epicurus

There is no surviving evidence of any polemical writing by Epicurus against the Stoics; we only have a few testimonies which suggest that Epicurus was acquainted with the Stoic school and might even have written about them, though not neces-

¹¹ See for example Phld. *De signis* col. XIX 4–11 De Lacy = fr. 15 Angeli-Colaizzo; Philodemus' text suggests that Zeno of Sidon had criticized the Stoic theory of inference. Also, fragments from Demetrius Lacon suggest that he too had engaged in criticism of Stoic doctrine in his writings *De poematis* (P Herc. 188 and 1014; see C. Romeo, *Demetrio Lacone: La poesia* [P.Herc. 188 e 1014], La scuola di Epicuro 9 [Napoli, 1988]) and [*De Forma Deī*] (P Herc. 1055; see M. Santoro, [*La Forma del Dio*] [P.Herc. 1055], La scuola di Epicuro 17 [Napoli, 2000]). And above all, Philodemus' writings provide evidence for Epicurean polemics against the Stoics: *De pietate* (see A. Henrichs, 'Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im P.Herc. 1428', *CERC* 4 (1974), 5–32 and D. Obbink, *Philodemus On Piety. Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary*, (Oxford, 1996)), *De signis* (see Ph. De Lacy and E. De Lacy, *Philodemus. On Methods of Inference*, La scuola di Epicuro 1 (Napoli, 1978)), *De dis* (see H. Diels, *Philodemos Über die Götter. Erstes Buch* [Berlin, 1916] and H. Diels, *Philodemos Über die Götter. Drittes Buch* [Berlin, 1917]), *De Stoicis* (see T. Dorandi, 'Filodemo. Gli Stoici [P.Herc. 155 e 339]', *CERC* 12 [1982], 91–133).

¹² Even Colotes in his all-embracing polemic against the most important philosophers of his past and present does not include the Stoics among his targets.

¹³ Of course, one needs to be very careful when counting a certain passage as critical/polemical or not, especially when dealing with fragmentary texts. On the question of what can be taken as polemical in Epicurean texts, such as Lucretius' *De rerum natura*, see Kleve (n. 1). See also n. 8 above.

sarily *against* them. One such testimony is to be traced in a fragment from an anonymous Epicurean writer preserved in *P Herc.* 176 (fr. 5 XXIV Vogliano = fr. 156 Usener = [67] Arrighetti):¹⁴

τοιούτοις ἤθεσί τε καὶ πάθεισι καὶ ταῖς [πρὸς] ἐκ[ά]στ[ους] ἐ[πι]ιδ[ε]ξί[ο]ις ὁ[μι]λίαις
ἐ[κ]έχ[ρη]το Πολύαινος, ὥστε κα[ὶ] τοὺς ἀπὸ τ[ῶ]ν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων εὐμενεῖς
κατε[σ]κευ[ακ]έναι πρὸς αὐτόν, [ο]ὐ μόν[ον] τοὺς ἀπὸ τ[ῆ]ς ποικίλης στοᾶς ὑπὲρ
ὧν καὶ Ἐ[πι]κ[ρο]υ[ρο]ς ἐ[γ]ρα[ψ]εν [ἐ]πί [τ]ε [Φ]ιλ[ίπ]που πρὸς [α]ὐτόν καὶ [Α]
εὐν[τ]έα ...

Polyaenus possessed such morals and feelings and the right type of interactions towards each one [*sc.* of his acquaintances?] that he had made even the followers of other philosophers well-disposed towards him and not only those from the Stoa Poikilē; about these Epicurus too wrote, when Philip was archon, in the letter he sent to him [*sc.* Polyaenus] and Leonteus ...

The prepositional phrase ‘about these’ (in Greek: ὑπὲρ ὧν) could at first glance be taken to refer to the immediately preceding noun that agrees in gender and number with the pronoun ὧν, that is, the philosophers of the Stoa Poikilē (τοὺς ἀπὸ τ[ῆ]ς ποικίλης στοᾶς). If understood in this way, the fragment preserves an important piece of information regarding Epicurus’ discussion of the Stoic school in a letter he addressed to fellow Epicureans.¹⁵ However, it should be pointed out that the fragment here is not entirely clear-cut: the phrase ὑπὲρ ὧν could be construed as referring not to the immediately antecedent noun but either to the content of the preceding sentence as a whole,¹⁶ or even to the demonstrative antecedent τοιούτοις.¹⁷ In this case what the fragment would rather suggest is that in his letter to Polyaenus, Epicurus had written not about the Stoics in particular, but about Polyaenus himself and his congenial nature and good relationship with other philosophers, quite probably in a laudatory manner.¹⁸ Such a broader inter-

¹⁴ *P Herc.* 176 preserves a number of fragments coming from letters written by Epicurus and his immediate students; from what survives of this collection it can be assumed that these letters must also have served as accounts of the lives and deeds of Epicurean philosophers, quite possibly in an encomiastic manner, and with an emphasis on the friendship among the members of the school. For a discussion of parts of *P Herc.* 176, see A. Angeli, ‘La scuola Epicurea di Lampsaco nel *P Herc.* 176 (fr. 5, coll. I, IV, VII–XXII)’, *CErc* 18 (1988), 27–51.

¹⁵ Cf. Tepedino Guerra (n. 1) at 148–9.

¹⁶ A *TLG* survey of the prepositional phrase ὑπὲρ ὧν at the beginning of a clause (where the relative pronoun ὧν is effectively used as a demonstrative; on this see H.W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* [Cambridge, MA, 1956], paragraph 2490) showed that sometimes the phrase ὑπὲρ ὧν can be used to refer to what has been said in the previous sentence (or even sentences) as a whole, rather than to the immediately preceding noun or the conceptual antecedent of the relative pronoun. This happens in particular when the sentence beginning with ὑπὲρ ὧν is governed by a verb signifying ‘to say’, ‘to recount’ or ‘to think’. For some examples of this syntactical usage see Isoc. 14.16, 6.96–7; Polyb. 3.28.4–5, 3.37.4–5; Diod. Sic. 1.34.11; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.21.10, *Lys.* 6.17; Plut. *Brut.* 25.6; Gal. *De meth. med.*, 10 p.228 Kühn, *In Hipp. De nat. hom. com.* 15 p.48 Kühn. It is worth noting that this syntactical structure appears more frequently in post-classical Greek.

¹⁷ For the demonstrative antecedents of relative pronouns see Smyth (n. 16), paragraph 2503.

¹⁸ In fact, as it stands the fragment does not necessarily suggest that in his letter Epicurus had referred to Polyaenus’ good relations with the Stoics in particular. The anonymous Epicurean author of *P Herc.* 176 may have derived this piece of information from another source and not from Epicurus’ letter to Polyaenus.

pretation of the phrase *ὑπὲρ ὧν* and, consequently, of the fragment as a whole, may gain further weight if one considers that the praise of fellow Epicureans, their morals and their disposition (*'laus amicorum'*) was not an uncommon theme in Epicurean epistolography and literature more generally (the inference often being that practising Epicurean philosophy made one a better person).¹⁹ So, although this fragment is important in that it certainly testifies to the interaction between an early Epicurean, Polyaenus, and the Stoics, it cannot necessarily be used as a proof for Epicurus' own preoccupation with, or even attention to, the Stoa *in writing* (let alone in polemical writing). Such a conclusion depends on how one construes the syntax of the text; and this is not straightforward. It is interesting to note, however, that this fragment also suggests that having good relations with philosophers from other sects, and with the Stoics in particular, was perceived by the Epicurean author of *P Herc.* 176 as something unusual; so much so that the case of Polyaenus' amiability towards other philosophers was deemed worthy of special mention. By implication, the fragment could be taken as a testimony for a climate of antagonism between philosophical schools (or at least, between the Epicureans and other philosophers).

A passage which suggests that Epicurus knew of the Stoics and had mentioned them in his writings is found in Diogenes Laertius 7.5 (= fr. 198 Usener). In discussing the early stages of the history of the Stoic school, Diogenes (or his source) refers to its name and reports that, according to Epicurus, prior to being called 'Stoics', Zeno and his followers were first known as 'Zenonians';²⁰ this piece of information, Diogenes says, originated in Epicurus' letters. The passage does not allow for any further inferences about Epicurus' preoccupation with the Stoic school and the point he may have wished to convey by referring to early Stoic nomenclature. Perhaps Epicurus was only providing the recipient of his letters with some purely factual information; or he might have wanted to make a comment about the early stages of the Stoic school and the dominant presence of Zeno in it.

Diogenes Laertius preserves yet another piece of evidence for Epicurus' reference to the Stoics: in 7.9 (= fr. 119 Usener = [45] Arrighetti) he discusses the connection between Zeno and Antigonus (Gonatas) and mentions that the latter had invited the former to join his court. Zeno is said to have refused and sent his followers, Persaeus and Philonides, instead.²¹ According to Diogenes, in a letter to his brother Aristoboulus, Epicurus made reference to the fact that these two Stoics had gone to live with Antigonus in his court. Unfortunately, we hear no more about the content of Epicurus' letter and the context of his reference to

¹⁹ See e.g. fr. 115 Usener = [41] Arrighetti, fr. 117 Usener = [43] Arrighetti, fr. 141 Usener = [65] Arrighetti, fr. 161 Usener = [118] Arrighetti, fr. 196 Usener = [81] Arrighetti. Carneiscus' writing *Φιλίστας* (fragments of which remain in *P Herc.* 1027) is another specimen of an encomium of a friend who is described as the ideal Epicurean follower. On Carneiscus' work and the Epicurean encomia to friends see Capasso (1988) (n. 2), 37–53.

²⁰ The term *Ζηνώνειοι* as a variant of the name of the Stoic school is found only in this passage from Diogenes Laertius and in Suda s.v. *Στωϊκοί*. However, the phrase *οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος* occurs frequently in secondary sources and refers either to the Stoics in general (see *SVF* 1.37, 164, 197) or to the Stoic followers of Zeno in particular (see *SVF* 1.65, 3.468). It may thus be assumed that it was not uncommon in antiquity to refer to the Stoics, especially of the first generation, as 'Zenonians'.

²¹ For the connection between Zeno, Persaeus and Antigonus see also Phld. *Stoic. Hist.* cols. VIII–IX, XIII–XIV Dorandi; cf. *SVF* 1.436, 439, 440–4, 449, 451–2.

the Stoic presence in the Macedonian court. Perhaps Epicurus wished to highlight the discipline and loyalty of Zeno's disciples, Persaeus and Philonides, who had followed their master's order and joined Antigonos' court. On the other hand, given the Epicurean rejection of involvement in public life and the well-known principle *λάθε βιώσας* it might be suggested that Epicurus' reference to the Stoics' close association with the Macedonian court was probably unfavourable or even critical in tone.²²

Finally, another possible trace of anti-Stoic criticism could be seen in a letter which Epicurus is said to have addressed to the otherwise unknown Dositheus and Pyrron on the occasion of the death of Hegesianax (son and brother of Dositheus and Pyrron respectively). Apparently in this consolatory letter (preserved by Plut. *Non posse* 1101a = fr. 120 Usener = [46] Arrighetti) Epicurus had argued against those who reject mourning and lamentation at the death of friends and instead encourage the absence of grief (*ἀλυπία*) which leads to absence of feeling (*ἀπαθές*). Since the lack of sorrow and the extirpation of passions (*apatheia*) are concepts familiar from Stoic ethical theory (cf. *SVF* 3.107, 112, 144, 448, 454; Epict. 4.3.8.; 3.24.117), it might be suggested that this testimony shows Epicurus indirectly attacking ideas associated with Stoic ethics in this letter. But as there is no explicit mention of the Stoics in this passage, and as also the thesis on *ἀλυπία* and *ἀπάθεια* seems to be primarily connected with Stoics who postdate Epicurus (Chrysippus and Roman Stoics), it is far from certain that Epicurus had indeed intended to attack the Stoics in particular. Even so, it is worth noting Epicurus' reaction to ideas, quite possibly of Cynic origin,²³ which at a later stage will have become trademark theses of Stoic ethics.

Epicurus was certainly acquainted with the Stoic school. However, as far as the extant evidence goes, his engagement with the Stoa does not seem to have been very systematic. It has to be conceded, of course, that this evidence is scanty and any conclusion about Epicurus' attitude to the Stoics can only be accepted with caution and caveats. None the less, one may reasonably think that, had Epicurus produced some influential piece(s) of criticism of the Stoics, we would have had some indication about it at least through secondary sources. Was it perhaps too early for Epicurus to have preoccupied himself with Zeno *in extenso*? This might be a way to explain Epicurus' distance from the Stoa and the apparent absence of an open debate with it. When Epicurus set out to establish his own school at the end of the fourth century B.C. (c. 306/5 B.C.), it seems that he wished primarily to differentiate his own system from the preceding philosophical tradition – hence most of his surviving criticism of professional rivals concerns the traditional pre-Hellenistic schools, some of which, of course, continued to exist, in one form or

²² G. Roskam, *Live Unnoticed (Λάθε βιώσας): On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine* (Leiden, 2007) at 50 refers to this passage from Diogenes Laertius in connection with Epicurus' principle *λάθε βιώσας*; however, he seems to read it only as evidence for Epicurus' interest in and knowledge of political affairs of his day.

²³ Self-sufficiency and mastering one's passions were characteristic of the philosophy and lifestyle advocated and practised by the Cynics. The anecdotes about the life and behaviour of the main Cynic philosophers and Diogenes in particular (in Diog. Laert. 6.19–105) offer ample illustration of the Cynic *αὐτάρκεια* and *ἀπάθεια*. See D.R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century AD* (London, 1937), 17–94; R.B. Branham and M.O. Goulet-Cazé (edd.), *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1996), 1–27; A.A. Long, 'The Socratic legacy', in Algra, Barnes, Mansfeld, and Schofield (n. 3), 623–32.

other, in his day. Zeno's Stoa, founded in c. 300 B.C.,²⁴ may not yet have struck Epicurus as an opponent worthy of consideration, or even an opponent which was so radically different from certain of his predecessors as to merit special attention. Perhaps this was a task left for his immediate followers to accomplish?

The Epicurean kathēgemones: Metrodorus, Polyaeus, Hermarchus

The situation is, unfortunately, no better, when one turns to the evidence about the *kathēgemones* of the Epicurean school: they too (like Epicurus) appear to have been familiar with the Stoics and their doctrines, and to have written about them. Yet the signs of a systematic engagement with or polemic against the Stoa are rather limited.

To start with Epicurus' prime follower, Metrodorus, the testimonies relating to his works suggest that he was actively involved in criticizing professional rivals in his writings, though not with the Stoics in particular.²⁵ It is possible to detect places among the testimonies where anti-Stoic criticism might have been implied, but there is no explicit extant trace thereof. So, for example, in a work entitled *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* Metrodorus appears to have criticized 'certain wise men' (τῶν σοφῶν τινες) who showed an interest in public life and in matters pertaining to lawgiving and political organization (fr. 31 Körte = Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1127B, fr. 32 Körte = Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1127C). It could be suggested that Metrodorus might have been aiming at the Stoics' involvement in public life²⁶ whether through their association with men of power, such as Antigonus Gonatas, or through writings on politics, such as Zeno's *Πολιτεία* which, as the title suggests, included Zeno's theory of the ideal state and his (radical) suggestions for the reorganization of social institutions and values.²⁷ This interpretation would be in line with the testimony discussed above regarding Epicurus' (possibly negative) comment on the Stoics' connections with the court of Antigonus (Diog. Laert. 7.9 = fr. 119 Usener = [45] Arrighetti).

Polyaeus, another of Epicurus' closest associates, seems also to have been engaged in philosophical criticism of various opponents, as the remaining fragments from his writings testify.²⁸ Interestingly enough, and unlike Metrodorus, in the case of Polyaeus we have explicit evidence regarding his interactions with the Stoic school. First, as already pointed out above, Polyaeus is mentioned in *P Herc.* 176 fr. 5 XXIV Vogliano (= fr. 15 Tepedino Guerra) as an Epicurean who had entertained amicable relations with and attracted the favour of the representatives

²⁴ For the chronology of the Hellenistic schools see Dorandi (n. 5), 31–54; for the Stoa in particular, see Sedley (2003) (n. 5).

²⁵ For the testimonies and fragments of Metrodorus, see A. Körte, 'Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta', *Jahrbücher für Klassische Philologie*, Suppl. 17 (1890), 531–97. A new edition is currently under preparation by A. Tepedino Guerra.

²⁶ Cf. Roskam (n. 22) at 70–1; Roskam further suggests that Metrodorus may have wished to target primarily the Peripatetics with this comment. E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* (Firenze, 1936), vol. 2, 56–9 had earlier argued that Metrodorus' writing must have been concerned with Aristotle's (now lost) work of the same title; *contra*, Tepedino Guerra (n. 1) at 178; Obbink (n. 11) at 479.

²⁷ For Zeno's *Πολιτεία*, see *SVF* 1.259–71. See also n. 60 below.

²⁸ For a collection of the testimonies and extant fragments of Polyaeus, see Tepedino Guerra (n. 1).

of other philosophical schools, including the Stoics.²⁹ Even though this testimony does not reveal much about any philosophical interaction between Polyaenus and his Stoic friends, it still suggests that the Epicurean was probably well acquainted with the Stoa; hence he may have been aptly placed to engage in philosophical dialogue with the Stoics through his writings or even in 'live' debates with his Stoic acquaintances. Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of my investigation here, there is evidence to the effect that Polyaenus had actually written against the Stoics: in *De pietate* I, col. 1. 1–14 Obbink (= fr. 30 Tepedino Guerra), Philodemus refers to a treatise of Polyaenus entitled *Πρὸς Ἀρίστωνα* in which Polyaenus is said to have responded to Ariston's polemic against his fellow-Epicurean Metrodorus. Now if this Ariston is to be identified with the Stoic Ariston of Chios, as most modern scholars suggest,³⁰ then we do have an explicit reference to an anti-Stoic writing by a first-generation Epicurean; but we also have an important testimony about an anti-Epicurean attack by an early Stoic.³¹ In other words, this fragment from *De pietate* gives evidence for a two-way debate with a Stoic attack and an early Epicurean's counter-attack in response. The topic of this controversy in the relevant passage from Philodemus seems to have been religion and the conception of the gods on which the Epicureans and the Stoics had largely divergent views.³² Unfortunately, all that can be gleaned from the fragmentary passage about the actual point at issue is that Polyaenus responded to some claim Ariston had made to the effect that the gods ἄλλους εἶναι οὐδὲ οὓς ὑπολαμβάνουσι [*sc. οἱ πολλοὶ* or οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι] (col.1, lines 7–9 Obbink). Depending on whether we

²⁹ Polyaenus seems to have been generally well known for his good-natured and amicable disposition: see also Diog. Laert. 10.24.

³⁰ See A.M. Ioppolo, *Aristone di Chio e lo Stoicismo antico* (Napoli, 1980) at 312–16; Tepedino Guerra (n. 1) at 51–5 and 178–9; Obbink (n. 11) at 283–4. The Peripatetic Ariston of Ceos, the other known Ariston of the third century B.C., can be ruled out as Polyaenus' opponent on chronological grounds (Ariston of Ceos was born c. 250 B.C., long after Polyaenus' death).

³¹ According to Obbink (n. 11) at 284: 'The testimony is valuable because the Epicureans are usually supposed to have attracted little attention from the other Athenian philosophical schools of the fourth century ...'

³² One important point of disagreement between the Epicurean and Stoic conception of the gods is the question of divine providence: the former denied altogether any involvement of the gods in the creation of the world and in human affairs as this would go against the gods' blessedness (see Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 76–82, *Ep. Men.* 123–34, fr. 359–72, Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.51–6 = part of fr. 352 Usener; Lucr. 5.156–234). In contrast, the Stoics propounded the idea of an immanent, rational and providential god who governs the world (see *SVF* 1.172, 537, 2.1011, 1012, 1021, 1106–26. Cf. also Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.18–23, where the Epicurean spokesman Velleius criticizes the Stoic notion of divine providence). Another point of disagreement was the issue of anthropomorphism. The Epicureans argued for anthropomorphism (see Epicurus fr. 352, 353, 355, 357, 358 Usener; Lucr. 5. 1169–78; Phld. *De dis* III [*P Herc.* 152/157] col. XIII.20– col. XIV.13 p.36s Diels, *De signis* col. XXII.17–28 De Lacy; [Demetrius Lacon] [*De forma deī*] [*P Herc.* 1055] cols. XIV–XX Santoro); on the other side, the Stoics had rejected the notion of anthropomorphic gods: *SVF* 2.1021, 1057–1060, 1076. Evidence of Epicurean–Stoic controversy over the issue of anthropomorphism can be found in the second part of *De pietate* (*P Herc.* 1428, col. V.28–col. VI.1; col. VIII.25–8; col. X.16–XI.5 Henrichs). For a discussion of Epicurean theology and religion, see A.J. Festugière, *Epicurus and his Gods*, tr. C.W. Chilton (Oxford, 1955); K. Kleve, 'On the beauty of God. A discussion between Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics', *SO* 53 (1978), 69–83; D. Obbink, 'The atheism of Epicurus', *GRBS* 30 (1988), 187–223; J. Mansfeld, 'Aspects of Epicurean theology', *Mnemosyne* 46 (1993), 172–210; Obbink (n. 11), 1–23; Santoro (n. 11), 43–65; K. Kleve, 'Epicurean theology and Herculaneum papyri', *CErc* 33 (2003), 249–66; for a comparative discussion of Epicurean and Stoic theology and Academic criticism against both, see J. Mansfeld, 'Theology', in Algra, Barnes, Mansfeld, and Schofield (n. 3), 452–78.

take the subject of the verb ὑπολαμβάνουσι in this fragment to be ‘the many/the people’ (οἱ πολλοί) or ‘the Epicureans’, Ariston’s claim suggests that the Epicurean view about gods differs either from the ordinary conception about gods³³ or from reality.³⁴ Ariston’s complaint about the Epicurean view on gods here seems to be in line with another testimony which refers to his criticism of the divergent theses philosophers held regarding religion and theology. According to Eusebius’ report (*PE* 15.62.7 = *SVF* 1.353), Ariston had found fault with the fact that the inquiry into physics had led philosophers to impious (ἀσεβεῖς) views that are in conflict with the established customs (τοῖς νόμοις ὑπεναντίους), such as the views about divinity which identified the gods with πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς νομιζομένους [*sc. εἶναι θεοὺς ἀξιοῦν*] (‘everything but the customary gods’). It could be assumed that the aspect of Epicurean theology which Ariston might have considered as going against ‘the customary gods’ in the passage from *De pietate* and which Polyaeus may have defended in response, is the Epicurean idea that the gods are not in any way involved in nature and in human life.³⁵ In fact it is worth pointing out that the words ὑπεναντίος and ὑπεναντιότης appear in the passage from the letter to Herodotus where Epicurus emphasizes the need to observe the conception of blessedness associated with the gods so that no beliefs *conflicting* (ὑπεναντίας) with this blessedness arise (such as the belief that the gods somehow interfere with human life); otherwise, Epicurus continues, this conflict will create the greatest turmoil in men’s souls (*Ep. Hdt.* 76–8). If we combine the Epicurean passage with Ariston’s complaint (*apud* Eusebius) about physical inquiry leading to theories that *are in conflict* (ὑπεναντίους) with the laws and customs, and also take into account Ariston’s criticism against Metrodorus as attested in *De pietate*, then the reasoning of Ariston’s criticism may be reconstructed as follows: Epicurus proposed the view that the gods do not in any way participate in human affairs because he thought that this would conflict with the gods’ blessedness, which all human beings acknowledge; yet this view – according to Ariston – conflicts with the customary conception of the gods as supernatural beings which govern the workings of the world and human life.³⁶

³³ Assuming that the implied subject of ὑπολαμβάνουσι is ‘the many/the people’, Ariston’s claim reads: ‘the gods are different and not the ones that the many believe <them to be>’. In this case, Ariston would probably be referring to the Epicurean gods and his claim may be taken to reflect – and thus to reply to – Epicurus’ thesis in *Ep. Men.* 123 that the gods ‘are not of the kind which the many believe them to be’ (οἷους δ’ αὐτοὺς <οἱ> πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, οὐκ εἰσὶν). See Obbink (n. 11) at 283–4.

³⁴ If one takes the implied subject of ὑπολαμβάνουσι to be ‘the Epicureans’, then Ariston’s claim reads: ‘the gods are different and not the ones assumed by the Epicureans’; that is, the gods in reality are not as the Epicureans take them to be. For this reading, see Tepedino Guerra (n. 1), at 123 and 179.

³⁵ According to Cicero’s introduction in his *De natura deorum* (1.2), the question of divine providence has caused the greatest disputes over theology among the various philosophical schools. It has also been suggested that Ariston’s criticism of the Epicurean conception of the gods was in all probability concerned with the issue of anthropomorphism, which the Stoics had rejected: see Obbink (n. 11) at 284. Ariston himself is known even to have doubted whether the gods had sensation or were animate (*SVF* 1.378).

³⁶ If my reconstruction here is correct, then an underlying point in Ariston’s criticism seems to have been that the Epicurean conception of gods is inconsistent: in order to observe the anti-teleology of an atomic universe, Epicurus endorses one widely accepted view about the gods, namely that they are blessed, at the expense of rejecting another equally customary view about the gods, namely that they play an important role in human life.

Whether Polyaenus' writing against Ariston was exclusively dedicated to discussion of gods and religion is impossible to tell. It is, however, interesting to point out that Ariston is known as a rather 'unorthodox' Stoic with a peculiar Cynic outlook.³⁷ He is said to have renounced the study of physics and dialectic and to have focussed only on ethics, following in this way, along with the Cynics, the example of Socrates (*SVF* 1.351, 353–4, 356–7). His main ethical doctrine, the thesis that everything other than virtue and vice is indifferent (*SVF* 1.351, 360–8), came in contrast with Zeno's theory of preferred/non-preferred goods that have intrinsic value/disvalue, and was closer in spirit to Cynic views. Given Ariston's philosophical outlook and interests, it might be plausible to assume that his criticism of Epicurean gods could have been part of a broader discussion/debate on ethics. And subsequently Polyaenus' polemic against Ariston need not have been restricted to matters of theology and religion.

Turning now to the last of the Epicurean *kathēgemones* and Epicurus' successor in the headship of the Garden, Hermarchus of Mytilene, the surviving testimonies suggest that he too must have been extensively involved in criticizing professional rivals.³⁸ Yet there is, sadly, no explicit reference to the Stoics in any of the testimonies or fragments of Hermarchus surviving today. Certain passages, however, which are now attributed to the most influential, as it seems, treatise of Hermarchus, namely the *Πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα*,³⁹ are thought to have included discussion and implicit criticism of the Stoics.

These passages are preserved in Porphyry's *De abstinentia* in the context of a presentation of theories opposing vegetarianism, and they refer to the evolution of justice and the law regarding homicide in human society (fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porph. *Abst.* 1.7–12, 26.4).⁴⁰ More particularly, in the part of his work preserved by Porphyry, Hermarchus appears to have argued for the theory that justice and law had arisen out of a combination of nature and reason: first, it was seen to be naturally beneficial for the survival of humankind not to commit homicide; at a second stage, the first lawgivers realized the natural benefits of abstaining from homicide, and as a result pronounced homicide impious and punishable, and established laws to that effect (fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porph. *Abst.* 1.7–1.8 and 1.10). At the beginning of his argument, Hermarchus suggests (always according to Porphyry's testimony) that the ancient lawgivers saw that homicide is impious (at least partly) because of the fact that there exists some kind of natural affinity

³⁷ It should be noted that the extent of Ariston's deviation from Stoic 'orthodoxy' is difficult to determine, especially since the portrait of the 'unorthodox' Ariston derives from later sources and so may have been for the most part a construct of later tradition. On the philosophy of Ariston of Chios and the Cynic elements in it see Ioppolo (n. 30); A.A. Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy', *CQ* 38 (1988), 150–71 esp. 164–71; J. Porter, 'The philosophy of Aristo of Chios', in Branham and Goulet-Cazé (n. 23), 156–89.

³⁸ For a collection of the testimonies and extant fragments of Hermarchus, see F. Longo Auricchio, *Ermarco. Frammenti*, La scuola di Epicuro 6, (Napoli, 1988).

³⁹ For a discussion of the title of this writing and its connection with *Ἐπιστολικά περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους*, which is another of Hermarchus' titles preserved by Diogenes Laertius (10.25), see Longo Auricchio (n. 38) at 33–5 and 123–4; D. Obbink, 'Hermarchus, *Against Empedocles*', *CQ* 38 (1988), 428–35.

⁴⁰ For a discussion of the main arguments in favour of attributing these particular passages from Porphyry's *De abstinentia* to Hermarchus, see Longo Auricchio (n. 38) at 137–9; Obbink (n. 39); P. Vander Waerdt, 'Hermarchus and the Epicurean genealogy of morals', *TAPhA* 118 (1988), 87–106, at 87–9.

between human beings (fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porph. *Abst.* 1.7).⁴¹ The word used in this particular context for 'natural affinity' is a well-known term of Stoic ethics, namely *οἰκείωσις*. It has, therefore, been suggested⁴² that at this point of his work Hermarchus had engaged in dialogue with the Stoics, for whom the concept of *οἰκείωσις* played a central role in their theory of justice: Hermarchus will have borrowed a Stoic term and incorporated it into his discussion of justice, only to subordinate it to the Epicurean idea that it is above all its advantageousness that made justice necessary. In this argument Hermarchus may have implicitly criticized, or at least responded to, the Stoic ethical theory of *οἰκείωσις* by making it secondary to utilitarian considerations. Now the reason why this criticism of an aspect of Stoic ethics was included in a work against Empedocles seems to be the fact that in the framework of their theory of natural affinity the Stoics had probably appealed to Empedocles' views on the affinity between human beings and animals.⁴³ So it has been suggested that in essence Hermarchus' anti-Stoic attack was disguised as an attack on a philosophical predecessor of the Stoics, Empedocles.

This reading of the testimony from the *Πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα* reflecting Hermarchus' argument about human society and justice sounds attractive: it makes Hermarchus into one of the few early Epicureans whom we know to have engaged in substantial philosophical dialogue with the Stoics.⁴⁴ Yet after a more careful consideration of the evidence, this reading seems less convincing.

First, although there is general agreement among scholars about the attribution of this testimony to Hermarchus' *Πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα*, it is far from clear whether the passage from Porphyry is actually an accurate reproduction of Hermarchus' own text. And accuracy is something we need here, if the main argument in support of the view that Hermarchus targeted the Stoic theory is the fact that he had used the Stoic term *οἰκείωσις* in his discussion. We know that the etiquette of quoting was rather different in antiquity than it is today: accuracy was not always the prime concern, and ancient writers can be seen to modify slightly the text they were 'quoting' (even when they claim to quote verbatim) and adapt it to the style of their own writing.⁴⁵ Thus, granting that the passage from Porphyry is a quotation

⁴¹ The passage in question is as follows: ... οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθετοῦντες, ἀπιδόντες εἰς τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινωνίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράξεις, ἀνόσιον ἐπεφήμισαν τὴν ἀνθρώπου σφαγὴν καὶ ζημίας οὐ τὰς τυχοῦσας προσήψαν, τάχα μὲν καὶ φυσικῆς τινος οἰκειώσεως ὑπαρχούσης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀνθρώπους διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς μορφῆς καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ μὴ προχεύειν φθεῖρειν τὸ τοιοῦτον ζῶον ὥσπερ ἕτερόν τι τῶν συγκεχωρημένων· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν γε πλείστην αἰτίαν τοῦ δυσχερανθῆναι τοῦτο καὶ ἀνόσιον ἐπιφημισθῆναι τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν εἰς τὴν ὅλην τοῦ βίου σύστασιν ὑπολαβεῖν ('the ancient lawgivers, looking at the affinity in the life of men and at men's interactions with each other, proclaimed manslaughter impious and attached no casual penalties for it, perhaps because there is some sort of natural *oikeiōsis* between men due to the resemblance of physical appearance and soul, such that it prevented the killing of this kind of animal [*sc.* human beings] in the same way that happens with some other <animal> from those which are allowed [*sc.* to kill]). However, the main reason for finding this [*sc.* manslaughter] intolerable and proclaiming it impious was that it was taken to be detrimental to the whole constitution of human life').

⁴² See primarily Vander Waerdt (n. 40); also Obbink (n. 39) at 431–2.

⁴³ See Obbink (n. 39) at 431–2, Vander Waerdt (n. 40) at 89–90.

⁴⁴ According to Vander Waerdt (n. 40), 91 n. 19 'Hermarchus' text provides the only early evidence of serious discussion between the two schools [*sc.* the Epicurean and the Stoic school]'.

⁴⁵ See e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 7.18–25 quoting Thuc. 1.22.4; Ath. 3.55.10–13 quoting Pl. *Plt.* 261e; Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.92–5 quoting Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.2–6; Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.105–7 quoting Pl. *Ti.* 29d–e. For a detailed discussion of the alterations to be found in the quotations occurring in ancient writers, and ancient philosophers in particular, together with examples, see J.

from Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles*, it is still possible that the term *οἰκείωσις* does not actually derive from the original text itself; instead, it might have been an addition or adaptation by Porphyry.⁴⁶

However, even setting aside the technicalities of ancient quotations, and accepting that, despite modifications, Porphyry's testimony fairly accurately reflects Hermarchus' argument, another objection to the reading suggesting an anti-Stoic critique is that this particular passage does not have the tone of a critique at all: it is, rather, an exposition of a certain view of the development of the notion of justice in human society.⁴⁷ Finally, the connection between the Stoics and Empedocles is not one of straightforward intellectual heritage. The Stoics may have derived inspiration from Empedocles,⁴⁸ but did not openly make him a principal authority for

Whittaker, 'The value of indirect tradition in the establishment of Greek philosophical texts or the art of misquotation', in J.N. Grant (ed.), *Editing Greek and Latin Texts* (New York, 1989), 63–95. See also C.B.R. Pelling, 'Fun with fragments: Athenaeus and the historians', in D. Braund and J. Wilkins (edd.), *Athenaeus and his World: Reading Greek Culture in the Roman Empire* (Exeter, 2000), 171–90 for a discussion of how an ancient author (Athenaeus) may manipulate his quotations to make them fit his purpose.

⁴⁶ Vander Waerdt (n. 40) wishes to defend the accuracy of Porphyry's supposed quotation from Hermarchus and so argues that the term *οἰκείωσις* was a word that Hermarchus borrowed from the Stoics and used it in his text so as to make his point in response to Stoic theory. One of the arguments he appeals to in order to claim that Porphyry quotes from, rather than paraphrases, Hermarchus is that in the course of this long 'quotation' we find the word *ἐγώγωγε* (1.9.3), a first-person pronoun which suggests first-person narrative by Hermarchus quoted by Porphyry (pp. 94–5). However, *ἐγώγωγε* could express Porphyry's own voice; in this way Porphyry would be adding his view to the point of Hermarchus which he reports. After all, the particular idea in the sentence with *ἐγώγωγε*, namely that unintentional homicides were subject to the practice of expiation through purification, need not have been unsympathetic to Porphyry (that is, Vander Waerdt's suggestion that *ἐγώγωγε* should rather be attributed to Hermarchus would have had greater force, if the idea expressed in the sentence in which the word *ἐγώγωγε* occurs was something that Porphyry was unequivocally opposed to, for example animal slaughter). In fact, as it stands, the section from Hermarchus' text (*apud* Porphyry) discussing the introduction of purifications (1.9) seems to be interwoven with Porphyry's own views on the matter; there are clear Platonist echoes in this passage (for example, the reference to the non-rational part of the soul – cf. τὸ ἀνόητον τῆς ψυχῆς – and the irrational desire – cf. ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλόγου φορᾶς ἐπιθυμίας) which may well derive from Porphyry rather than Hermarchus himself. As for the switch from indirect to direct speech (after 1.7.2), which Vander Waerdt considers another indication that Porphyry was quoting and not paraphrasing, one can say that Porphyry actually does something similar (i.e. turning from third to first person) in his earlier presentation of the Peripatetic and Stoic views against vegetarianism (1.4–6); and this earlier presentation does not look as if it purports to be a quotation from one particular text (for one thing, Porphyry does not specify the particular author, whether Peripatetic or Stoic, on whose text[s] he relies). Doubts about whether the passage in Porphyry should be taken to reproduce Hermarchus' *ipsissima verba* have been raised by other scholars too: see K. Krohn, *Der Epikureer Hermarchos* (Berlin, 1921) at 3–6; Longo Auricchio (n. 38) at 138–9 and 145. That the term *οἰκείωσις* probably was Porphyry's own addition has been suggested by A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1987), vol. 2 at 137.

⁴⁷ Interestingly enough, even Vander Waerdt (n. 40) at 89 concedes that 'the polemical character of his (*sc.* Hermarchus') work is not prominent in our text'. That is, the particular passage interpreted as a reaction to and implicit critique of Stoic theory *does not* really appear polemical. However, that Hermarchus' work as a whole was a polemic against Empedocles is hinted at by Porphyry in 1.3. See Obbink (n. 39) at 428 and Vander Waerdt (n. 40) at 89.

⁴⁸ The evidence adduced in support of the assumption that the Stoics had drawn inspiration for their theory of *οἰκείωσις* from Empedocles' view about the affinity between humans and animals is only indirect, namely a passage from Sextus (*Math.* 9.126–31); this passage is said to imply, through Sextus' own inference as it seems, a possible connection between Empedocles' and the Stoics' view on the matter. See Obbink (n. 39) at 432 and Vander Waerdt (n. 40), at 90 n. 14.

their school, in the way, for example, they claimed Socrates as an authority. In fact, quite the contrary seems to be the case with respect to the issue under discussion here, namely natural affinity: in Porphyry's text, just before the passage attributed to Hermarchus, we find Peripatetic *and* Stoic arguments *against* vegetarianism (which Empedocles supported), and so *against* the thesis for the natural affinity between humans and animals (1.4–5).⁴⁹ That is to say, the Stoics were in disagreement themselves with Empedocles on the question of natural affinity between animals and men.⁵⁰ Consequently, it is not very plausible to assume that Hermarchus' polemic against Empedocles was meant to accommodate an attack against the Stoics when a) Empedocles was not an obvious forerunner of Stoicism and b) the Stoics are known to have held a view about natural affinity that was conflicting with that of Empedocles. All in all, the reading of the passage from Porphyry's *De abstinence* as representing Hermarchus' anti-Stoic criticism in disguise is imaginative but unpersuasive – a case of reading too much into thin evidence.⁵¹ As a result, we cannot draw decisive conclusions about Hermarchus' reaction to or preoccupation with the Stoa just from the particular testimony of Porphyry.

III. THE TESTIMONY OF COLOTES OF LAMPSACUS

Colotes was not among the four *kathēgēmones* of the Garden; yet he seems to have been considered as one of the eminent (ἐλλόγιμοι) Epicureans of his day (cf. Diog. Laert. 10.25). Moreover, we have reasons to believe that he entertained close connections with Epicurus, in all probability during the time when the latter was running a school in Lampsacus (c. 310/9–306/5 B.C.).⁵² Though until recently Colotes had not generally been granted much attention in modern scholarship, the fragments of his works which are preserved among the papyri from Herculaneum deserve closer inspection, as they can throw interesting light on the polemical literature of the early Epicurean school. For all of Colotes' writings known to us today seem to have been polemics against professional rivals: *P Herc.* 208 contains pieces from a writing entitled *Against Plato's Lysis* (Πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος Λύσιν), *P Herc.* 1032 preserves fragments from another anti-Platonic work, *Against Plato's Euthydemus* (Πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος Εὐθύδημον);⁵³ Plutarch's *Adversus Colotem*, as

⁴⁹ Cf. also *SVF* 3.367 and 371.

⁵⁰ And actually the relevant passage from Sextus (*Math.* 9.126–31, see n. 48 above), seems to argue for the opposite view. Thus Sextus reports that, according to the Stoics, it is not because of *pneuma* pervading everything that human beings have a sense of justice towards each other and towards the gods; it is, rather, because of their sharing in reason. And this is precisely why, according to the Stoics, human beings *do not* have a relation of justice with animals.

⁵¹ My conclusion here is corroborated by Roskam (n. 22) at 77–8; Roskam too finds Vander Waerdt's reading of the passage from Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles* unpersuasive on the basis of (mainly) chronological considerations.

⁵² Epicurus is said to have addressed Colotes with diminutives, which can be taken as a sign of closeness (see Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1107D, Procl. *In R.* 2, 111.11 Kroll). He had also written letters to Colotes (probably after his return to Athens), which, again, may suggest a certain amount of familiarity with Colotes (see [62]–[66] Arrighetti).

⁵³ The fragments from the two anti-Platonic writings of Colotes were edited for the first time by W. Crönert, 'Kolotes und Menedemos', *Studien zur Paläographie und Papyruskunde* 6 (Leipzig, 1906), 5–7; following a later inspection of the papyri, Crönert produced a revised edition which was published as a *Nachtrag* in the same volume (Crönert [1906], 163–70); this second edition has been the standard since then, and it is the one I use here. Some revised

already mentioned, gives evidence for Colotes' general polemic entitled *Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἔστιν* ('On the fact that according to the doctrines of the other philosophers it is impossible even to live'); finally, Macrobius' *Commentarium in Somnium Scipionis* and Proclus' *In Platonis Rempublicam Commentarium* transmit testimonies about Colotes' critique of Plato's myths. What is important, however, for the purposes of the present paper is that among Colotes' fragments we find the only early Epicurean text that contains *explicit* criticism of a Stoic rival, namely the founder of the Stoic school, Zeno.

Towards the end of the surviving sequence of fragments from *Against Plato's Lysis* (extending roughly from T. VI, 12a–c Crönert), we find a reference first to the Stoa Poikilē (in 12a3) and later on to Zeno (in 12a8). The text is, regrettably, rather scrappy, and so a complete reconstruction of Colotes' argument at this part of his work is not possible; one can only propose tentative readings of those bits that are relatively legible, disjointed though they are.

The argument here seems to be targeting a certain Menedemus: Colotes addresses him in the vocative at T. VI, 12b9 Crönert.⁵⁴ Modern scholars have divided opinions over his identity; some suggest that it was Menedemus the Cynic⁵⁵ whereas others⁵⁶ opt for Menedemus the Eretrian, who belonged to a branch of the Megarian school. The content of Colotes' argument in this section, as far as it can be reconstructed, speaks, I believe, in favour of the identification of Menedemus with the Cynic: the discussion seems to revolve around the issue of the wise man, his self-sufficiency and ascetic lifestyle; that is, a trademark of Cynicism.⁵⁷ Moreover, according to

readings on certain passages were presented by A. Concolino Mancini, 'Sulle opere polemiche di Colote', *CErc* 6 (1976), 61–7. From then onwards no additional work has been published exclusively on these fragments (however, a new edition is under preparation by M. Erler). My discussion is, therefore, largely based on the readings of the fragments as presented in the edition of Crönert.

⁵⁴ The name *Μενέδημος* appears at least four times in this section of *P Herc.* 208 (T. VI, 12a4, 12b7, 12b9 and 12c4).

⁵⁵ See first Crönert (n. 53), 10–11; Crönert's suggestion has found support from most modern scholars: G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* (Napoli, 1983–85), 3.521–3; M. Gigante, *Cinismo e Epicureismo* (Napoli, 1992) at 73–8; Mendez and Angeli (n. 1) at 82–3; G. Indelli, 'Colote di Lampsaco, il bersaglio polemico di Plutarco e Polistrato, il terzo capo del Giardino', *CErc* 30 (2000), 45–52.

⁵⁶ Mainly Concolino Mancini (n. 53); the majority of scholars have not favoured this view. For a more recent discussion of the issue, see F. Alesse, 'La polemica di Colote contro il "Socratico" Menedemo', *CErc* 33 (2003), 101–6 who questions the identification of Menedemus in *P Herc.* 208 with the Cynic Menedemus, on the grounds that the evidence from Diogenes Laertius, on which this identification is based, is unreliable. Moreover, Alesse seems to think that there is nothing particularly or exclusively 'cynicizing' in Colotes' *Against Plato's Lysis*, such that it could warrant the Cynic identity of Menedemus; instead she proposes that Colotes' target here is rather generally Socratic (male) friendship and *paideia* as represented in the early Platonic dialogues. Although Alesse's reservations regarding Diogenes Laertius' testimony may be, to some extent, justified, I do not think that her reasons for discounting the possibility of a 'Cynic' target in Colotes' text are convincing. Alesse does not seem to take sufficiently into account T. VI, 12a–c, where, apart from a mention of lentils, we find references to the avoidance of pleasures and other (pretentiously) humble and menial activities which may well suggest that the target here is indeed the Cynicizing Stoic sage. Finally, Alesse's view that Colotes was rather targeting Socratic *paideia* and the relationship between *φίλοι* does not find adequate support in the remaining fragments, as there are no obvious references to education and male friendship. By contrast, the surviving text suggests that the topic in this part of the *Against Plato's Lysis* rather concerned the wise man and his austere way of life (see more below).

⁵⁷ It should be noted here that representatives of the Megarian school such as Stilpo and Menedemus of Eretria were somehow connected with Cynicism in the biographical tradition:

Diogenes Laertius (6.95), the Cynic Menedemus was said to have been a student of Colotes, presumably prior to turning to Cynicism. And even if one doubts the accuracy of this piece of information,⁵⁸ it is still quite telling that the biographical tradition, as reflected in Diogenes' passage, had somehow associated a Cynic Menedemus with Colotes: there may have been at least some kind of interaction between these two men such that it gave rise to the story found in Diogenes Laertius.

So, assuming that in this fragment from *Against Plato's Lysis* Colotes does indeed refer to his ex-student Menedemus, who abandoned Epicureanism to join the ranks of the Cynics, we are confronted with a very interesting specimen of an Epicurean attack on both the Cynics (Menedemus) and the Stoics (Zeno). That a connection between Cynicism and the Stoa existed is (and was in antiquity) common knowledge;⁵⁹ Zeno, in particular, at the beginning of his philosophical career is said to have espoused certain theses that were very much in the spirit of Cynicism.⁶⁰ However, what is quite significant about the fragment from Colotes' work is that it shows *how a first-generation Epicurean and contemporary with Zeno perceived the Stoa in its early days*: as a movement which was cognate with Cynicism and which ultimately derived its inspiration (much like Cynicism) from Socrates. Yet we can be more specific about how the extant text may lead to this interpretation.

for example, Stilpo is said to have been a pupil of Crates (Diog. Laert. 2.114; cf. 2.117–19) and Menedemus the Eretrian is said to have been called 'dog' by his fellow countrymen (Diog. Laert. 2.140). None the less, I am still inclined to believe that the Menedemus to whom Colotes directs his argument is to be taken as a Cynic proper. The reference to lentils, which will play an important role later on in the argument, speaks particularly in favour of this; see below for further details.

⁵⁸ See Alesse (n. 56) at 102–4.

⁵⁹ To begin with, this connection is reflected in the ancient biographical tradition: the founder of Stoicism, Zeno, is said to have been a student of the Cynic Crates (Diog. Laert. 6.105, 7.2, Numen. *apud* Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 14.5, 11 Des Places = *SVF* 1.11). Diogenes Laertius claims (6.104) that there is a close relationship between the two schools, and discusses the Stoics immediately after the Cynics; moreover, in the successions of philosophers given in 1.13–16 there is a line connecting Socrates with Chrysippus which goes through the Cynics (Socrates–Antisthenes–Diogenes the Cynic–Crates–Zeno–Cleanthes–Chrysippus); and though these successions are not always to be taken at face value, as in most cases they were fabricated by biographers/historiographers, they could at least be treated, albeit with caution, as indications of possible philosophical affinities between the various philosophers (especially when these indications are corroborated by additional evidence). Generally Stoicism is viewed as a development of Cynicism which itself is considered as a continuation of Socratic thought. For the philosophical relationship between Cynicism and Stoicism see Dudley (n. 23), esp. 95–103; J.M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1969) at 54–80; Long (n. 37); A. Brancacci, 'I κοινῇ ἀρέσκειντα dei cinici e la κοινωνία tra cinismo e stoicismo nel libro VI (103–105) delle *Vite* di Diogene Laerzio', *ANRW* II 36.6 (1992), 4049–75; A.A. Long, 'The Socratic tradition: Diogenes, Crates and Hellenistic ethics', in Branham and Goulet-Cazé (n. 23), 28–46; Long (n. 23); M.O. Goulet-Cazé, *Les Kynika du Stoïcisme*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 89 (Stuttgart, 2003). Moreover, an affinity between Cynicism and the early Stoa, in particular in the field of ethics, emerges when one compares the Cynic and Stoic views on happiness, austerity, virtue and the wise man's way of life (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.104, 7.104, 7.121, Cic. *Fin.* 3.68, Stob. *Ecl.* 114.22 Wachsmuth).

⁶⁰ For example, Zeno's early work *Πολιτεία* (*SVF* 1.259–71) left its mark as a work that was very much 'Cynic' in outlook. In fact, the work had caused embarrassment to later Stoics because of its provocative and Cynicizing suggestions; so much so that some Stoics denied that Zeno had composed it. For a thorough discussion of the Cynic elements in early Stoicism and the relevant passages, see Goulet-Cazé (n. 59).

According to the first few lines of the crucial section from the *Against Plato's Lysis*, Colotes seems to report that there were certain unfavourable comments about Menedemus circulating among the people frequenting the Stoa Poikilē; the text, as reconstructed by Crönert, reads:

... περιπατοῦσιν ἐν τῇ Ποικίλῃ στοᾷ λέ- γοντες, ὅτι Μενέδημον οὐκ ἀν]ήρει τὸ λέγειν εὐ- ήθη καὶ ἄφρονα καὶ ὀλί- γωρο]ν καὶ μάτ[αιον].	... they walk around in the Poikilē Stoa saying that calling Menedemus simple-minded and foolish and careless and vain did not destroy him
	(T. VI, 12a2–7 Crönert)

As it stands, this fragment is difficult to interpret in a wholly satisfactory way,⁶¹ and suggesting alternative readings to improve or replace Crönert's would require a fresh examination of the papyrus. I will, therefore, restrict myself here only to the general point that could be speculatively gleaned from the current text. So the gist of the passage seems to be that the people in the Stoa made remarks about Menedemus, possibly to the effect that he was not discouraged by abusive language directed against him. Yet why would Colotes mention in particular the Stoa Poikilē as the place where the rumours about Menedemus had been going on? Perhaps because there was a special connection between Menedemus and the Stoa so that the circulation of rumours about Menedemus in the Stoa in particular was something worthy of mention (or even criticism). Now on the assumption that Menedemus turned Cynic, and also considering the connection between the Cynics and the early Stoa, this passage might be taken to imply that the people in the Stoa were not just a random group that talked about Menedemus; they were rather seen by Colotes as Menedemus' own companions, hence their remarks could have had special significance.⁶² And if this interpretation sounds too imaginative to be true, then the least that this passage tells us is that Colotes had somehow associated Menedemus the Cynic with the Stoa.

In fact this association is confirmed in the line immediately following the passage about the Stoa Poikilē: from 12a8 on, Colotes' argument turns to Zeno, who is criticized jointly with Menedemus in the last section of the surviving fragments of *P Herc.* 208 (12a8–c16). As already mentioned, the reference to Zeno here is (at least so far) the only explicit reference to a Stoic to be found in a first-generation Epicurean text. As such it merits special attention. The issue under discussion appears to be the wise man (*φρόνιμος* or *σοφός*)⁶³ and his way of life

⁶¹ For one thing, the syntax presupposed by this reading of the fragment is rather awkward: I take it that the subject of the verb οὐκ ἀν]ήρει is the infinitive τὸ λέγειν, with Μενέδημον as the object of both the finite verb and the infinitive, and the accusative adjectives as predicates to Μενέδημον; as for the subject of λέγειν this could be either 'those who walk in the Poikilē Stoa' or somebody else mentioned earlier in the passage.

⁶² Especially if one construes the text in a way which suggests that the 'people walking in the Stoa Poikilē' did not just report that Menedemus was not deterred by the abusive characterizations thrown at him, but were also the ones who actually called Menedemus 'simple-minded and foolish' (that is, if we take the subject of the infinitive τὸ λέγειν to be the same as the subject of περιπατοῦσιν).

⁶³ The word *φρόνιμος* occurs throughout the passage: T. VI, 12a9 (*φρόνιμος*), 12b10–11 (*φρόνιμον*), 12c1 (*φρόνιμον*), whereas the word *σοφός* appears at least once, at 12c11 (as well as a couple of times in the preceding section at 11c2 and 11c8). It seems that the two terms

and action. Colotes raised two points: first, he made some (rather sarcastic, as it seems) comment on Zeno's thesis that the wise man will play ball and cook lentils (T. VI, 12a9–11). Secondly, and quite probably following from the reference to lentils, Colotes criticized the ascription of austerity and self-sufficiency to the wise man which, Colotes seems to suggest, Menedemus and Zeno alike made; leading a deliberately ascetic life, Colotes seems to have argued, does not make one happy (T.VI, 12a17–12c16).

But what are we to make out of these remarks about the wise man and lentils, how do they relate to the Platonic dialogue on which they are supposed to comment, and what is the connection between the *Lysis*, Menedemus and Zeno? Conclusive answers are hard to reach owing to the fragmentary state of the text; but, once again, a speculative interpretation is possible. The passage from Plato's *Lysis* that probably triggered Colotes' discussion about the wise man was 207d–210d, where Socrates is shown having an initial conversation with the young Lysis about love and the conditions under which one is loved by one's parents or by somebody else. First, it is in the context of this conversation that we find an argument about those who are the wise (*φρόνιμοι*),⁶⁴ their action, and the benefits of wisdom; and given that the fragment from Colotes refers to the wise man (*φρόνιμος*) a number of times (see n. 63), it might be assumed that in this part of his critique on the *Lysis* Colotes picks on the Platonic argument in *Lysis* 207d–210d. Secondly, the references to lentils and cooking throughout Colotes' discussion in 12a8–c16 might suggest that Colotes' remarks here were occasioned by the *Lysis* passage (209d) where Socrates gives the example of the king of Asia who would entrust the preparation of his food to somebody other than his son, provided he could be proved to be wiser than his son.⁶⁵

As to the reason why Colotes may have found fault with this section of the Platonic *Lysis*, the following assumption seems plausible: the main thrust of the argument in *Lysis* 207d–210d is that, according to Socrates' claims, it is only once one is 'wise' with respect to a certain matter that one can be free and trusted to take any action (relevant to this particular matter) one is willing to take. And granted that being happy means being free and able to do whatever one wants,⁶⁶ the principal conclusion of Socrates' argument here seems to be that one can only be happy (and so able to do on each occasion whatever one wishes to) if one is wise. In short, Socrates makes happiness dependent on wisdom.⁶⁷ Now Colotes

are used as synonyms here. It is, perhaps, worth noting that these two words appear at the beginning of the Platonic *Lysis* (207c–210d) and seem to be used interchangeably there; see T. Penner and C. Rowe, *Plato's Lysis* (Cambridge, 2005) at 18, n. 15.

⁶⁴ In fact the term *φρόνιμος* appears only in this particular passage from the *Lysis* (*φρόνιμοι* in 210a).

⁶⁵ See Crönert (n. 53) at 171; Concolino Mancini (n. 53) at 63–4; Gigante (n. 55) at 77; Indelli (n. 55) at 47, n. 30; *contra*, Alesse (n. 56) at 103–4.

⁶⁶ This can be inferred from Socrates' question to Lysis: 'Do you think that a man who is a slave and is not in a position to do whatever he wishes is happy?' (*δοκεῖ δέ σοι εὐδαίμων εἶναι ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων τε καὶ ᾧ μηδὲν ἐξείη ποιεῖν ὃν ἐπιθυμοῖ*; 207e); to this question Lysis responds negatively and Socrates then carries on the discussion taking the association between happiness and being free to do whatever one wishes as a given. Penner and Rowe (n. 63) at 20 ff. call this assumption 'childish'.

⁶⁷ Socrates' overall argument in this part of the *Lysis* is highly controversial as the main point that Socrates ends up making (210c–d) appears to be that one cannot be loved by anybody – not even by one's own parents – unless one is wise, because it is only then (when one is wise) that one will be useful. Penner and Rowe (n. 63), 12–38 have recently proposed an interpretation that

could somehow have associated the argument about wisdom and happiness in this section of the *Lysis* with Zeno's – and more generally the Stoics' – thesis that it is only the wise man who acts in the right way, is free and happy (*SVF* 1.216–18, 222; cf. *SVF* 3.557–63). And such an association should not appear too implausible given that the Stoics are known to have appealed to Socrates as a model for their views about the wise man, virtue and happiness, and may well have used the so-called Socratic dialogues of Plato in shaping their Socrates-inspired ethics.⁶⁸ Thus it is possible that Colotes might have considered Zeno's thesis as a contemporary development, or by-product, of the Socratic view about wisdom implied by the argument in this passage of the *Lysis* (as well as in other early Platonic dialogues⁶⁹). For in both cases the underlying idea is that being wise ensures the right sort of action on every occasion (even when it comes to cooking); and this wisdom ultimately constitutes happiness. Though, being an Epicurean, Colotes would probably accept the importance of wisdom in the pursuit of happiness (cf. Epicurus, *Ep. Men.* 132), he must have objected to the idea that wisdom is *sufficient* for happiness; thus the *Lysis* passage could have given Colotes an occasion for criticism of both Socrates' and Zeno's view on wisdom and the wise man.

Turning now to Colotes' text, the remark regarding Zeno in this context runs as follows:

ἀ δ' ὁ Ζήνων ἐ[υ]ημερεῖ,
ὃς τᾷ[λ]λα τὸν φρόνιμον
ποιεῖ[ν] ἔφη καὶ σφαιρί-
ζει[ν] καὶ φακῆν ἔψευ ...
(T. VI, 12a9–11 Crönert)

But as for those matters with respect to
which Zeno, who said that the wise man
does the other things, even playing ball
and cooking lentils, prospers ...

Quite possibly picking on the cooking example from *Lysis* 209d, Colotes seems to be rather ironically referring to the fact that, according to Zeno, the wise man does (and should) engage in menial activities such as playing ball and cooking lentils. There are indeed a number of anecdotes associated with Zeno and his disciples which suggest that the early Stoics promoted a simple and lowly way of life (cf. *SVF* 1.3–4, 277, 287, 597). It is thus plausible to assume that Colotes is targeting here precisely this idea which Zeno and the Stoics had about the wise man's life. It is, however, possible to see an additional point underlying Colotes'

vindicates Socrates' at first sight implausible argument: they argue that Socrates' point is rather that 'loving someone is wanting them to be wise, because benefit, happiness, depends on it' (at 33). My reading of the part of Socrates' argument that I take to be relevant to Colotes' point in his polemic follows the Penner and Rowe line of interpretation. However, it is worth adding here that the claim to the effect that one cannot be loved even by one's own parents unless one is wise, which Socrates apparently put forward in the *Lysis*, may well have given rise to some comment by Colotes on the issue of parental love. Being an Epicurean, Colotes probably subscribed to the view attributed to Epicurus, namely that parental love for offspring is not natural (see Epicurus fr. 525–7 Usener); thus one may well imagine that Colotes could have responded to the implausible claim in the *Lysis* by juxtaposing the Epicurean thesis on the matter.

⁶⁸ See Long (n. 37) for the Stoic appropriation of Socrates in general; G. Striker, 'Plato's Socrates and the Stoics', in P. Vander Waerdt (ed.), *The Socratic Movement* (Ithaca and London, 1994), 241–51 argues specifically for the view that the Stoics had read at least some of Plato's dialogues and had formed their ethics partly in connection with the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues. See also E. Brown, 'Socrates in the Stoa', in S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar (edd.), *A Companion to Socrates* (Oxford, 2006), 275–84.

⁶⁹ e.g. in the protreptic of the *Euthydemus* (278e–282e), which was Colotes' target in his other surviving polemic against a Platonic dialogue; see below.

remark here. If we take into account a) the passage from the *Lysis* (209d) which seems to be at the background of Colotes' comment here and suggests that, only if one is wise with respect to a certain matter, is one free and able to take action in this matter and b) the Stoic thesis that the wise man does everything right (*SVF* 1.216, 3.561, 709a), then Zeno's saying that the wise man cooks lentils and plays ball may further imply that the wise man cooks lentils and plays ball *wisely*. Such a reading can in fact be supported by a Stoic dictum, associated with Zeno in particular, which was presumably meant to stress precisely the idea that the wise man will act rightly and wisely in every situation, however trivial: *πάντα τε εὖ ποιήσει ὁ σοφὸς καὶ φακῆν φρονίμως ἀρτύσει*, 'the wise man will do everything right and will even prepare the lentils wisely' (*SVF* 1.217). Seen against this background, Colotes' remark might be taken to suggest not just that the Stoic wise man engages in humble activities unfitting to him, but that the *φρόνιμοι* find themselves in the paradoxical situation of exercising wisdom even with respect to trivial matters, for example cooking lentils and playing ball. Colotes might thus be implying that there is a certain amount of pretension, and eventually absurdity, in this attitude of the Stoic wise man.

The rest of the (legible part of the) section (12a17–12c16) focusses on the argument against the frugality and austerity of the wise man; this argument quite probably followed from the reference to lentils earlier. It is here that Cynic asceticism and Stoic self-sufficiency are more clearly treated by Colotes as two sides of the same coin.⁷⁰ In fact this association of Cynic and Stoic asceticism with the imagery of lentils, which is implied in Colotes' text, may well find support in other ancient Greek texts that refer to the ideology associated with lentils. Thus, in comedy, lentils generally signify poverty or at least lack of luxury.⁷¹ And in the later tradition (Timon of Phlius, Athenaeus, Diogenes Laertius), lentils as a symbol of poverty and asceticism became associated with the Cynics and the Stoics who alike denounced luxury and promoted the ascetic way of life.⁷² Against this background it could be assumed that Colotes picked on the references to lentils in the Cynic–Stoic discourse about the wise man and set out to criticize Menedemus and Zeno jointly for their recommendation of austerity and frugality as constituting the right way of life followed by the wise, which is supposed to ensure happiness. The main line of Colotes' argument here could be (roughly) reconstructed as follows: when the Cynic–Stoic wise man, who on each occasion acts in the right and virtuous way, cooks lentils, he is said to do so in such a way that no pleasure

⁷⁰ For Cynic asceticism, see Diog. Laert. 6.23, 70–1. For the Stoic view on austerity, and the Cynic way of life of the wise man, see *SVF* 3.637–9, 645; Diog. Laert. 7.121.

⁷¹ Cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 811, *Plut.* 1002–4. According to J. Wilkins, *The Boastful Chef: The Discourse of Food in Ancient Greek Comedy* (Oxford, 2000), 13–15: '... lentils constitute an earthy basis for the diet, probably for all, but in particular for the impoverished and those opposed to 'luxurious' and high-status dishes ... In Athenaeus' survey ... the two principal consumers of lentils are the poor and philosophers who identify the lentil as virtuous food'.

⁷² According to [Demetrius], *De elocut.* 170, Crates the Cynic appears to have written a *Praise of Lentils*. In a passage from Athenaeus (4.156C–158A), to which Wilkins (n. 71) at 13 refers, we read about Parmeniscus, an otherwise unknown author, who had written a *Symposium of Cynic Philosophers*; apparently in this text the Cynics were presented as having dined exclusively on lentils and conversed on frugality and a humble diet. Immediately after the supposed extract from Parmeniscus (4.158B ff.), Athenaeus gives four successive quotations all of which have to do with Stoics (Zeno and Chrysippus) or a Cynic (Crates) and their reference to or praise of lentils. Another anecdote about the Stoic Zeno, the Cynic Crates and a pot of lentils is found in Diog. Laert. 7.3.

is to be derived from eating them.⁷³ Even when it comes to something as simple and, almost by definition, as frugal as eating lentils, the right sort of action for the wise man would be deliberately to avoid any indulgence. According to Menedemus, who had obviously subscribed to this Cynic–Stoic view on austerity (wrongly, as Colotes remarks in 12b6–8),⁷⁴ by exercising such asceticism the wise man would *ἀλυπῶς τε καὶ εὖ* | *διάξειν* ('achieve a good life without pain', T. VI, 12b13–14). Now taking into account Colotes' Epicurean background, it could fairly safely be assumed that his objection to Menedemus here must have been governed by the idea that is central to Epicurean ethics: the way towards the good and happy life is through pursuing (rather than avoiding) pleasure. Thus, by deliberately subjecting himself to an ascetic way of life, the wise man would be far from achieving happiness. All that Colotes sees in such an attitude on the part of the Cynic–Stoic sage is presumptuous vulgarity.⁷⁵ Accordingly, towards the end of this section Colotes mockingly suggests that he would not be surprised if Zeno and Menedemus went even further in displaying their view on austerity: they might even advise that the wise man should engage in other trivial activities, seemingly appropriate for the austere way of life, such as washing lentils and heaping up coal to boil the lentils upon (T. VI, 12c10–15). Colotes' objection here is not directed against any trivial activities as such; it should rather be viewed as targeting what Colotes took to be an attempt on behalf of the Cynics/early Stoics to 'show off' the austere way of life they recommended.

Even though Colotes' critique of Zeno in *Against Plato's Lysis* is only fragmentary, one can still (with caution) draw certain conclusions about the early Epicureans' attitude towards the Stoics.

First, the Stoa in Zeno's day seems to have been closely associated with Cynicism and viewed by the Epicureans as a contemporary reworking of Socratic ethics. It is quite telling that Colotes' criticism of Zeno's 'Cynicizing' thesis about the wise man was part of his criticism of an early Platonic dialogue in which Socrates can be seen to engage in one of his usual conversations about wisdom, virtue and happiness. It is also important to highlight the fact that the other anti-Platonic work of Colotes, fragments of which survive in *P Herc.* 1032, was directed against Plato's *Euthydemus*, a dialogue that provided (at least some) inspiration for the Stoic ethical view on goods and indifferents:⁷⁶ in the section of Socrates' protreptic to philosophy (278e–282e) we find some version (however unrefined) of the idea that wisdom is happiness and that certain things normally considered good (such as wealth) are really indifferent. In fact, the surviving fragments from *Against Plato's Euthydemus* show that Colotes had focussed part of his criticism on this particular section of the dialogue (T. III, 7a–T. VII, 11d10 Crönert); he also seems to have referred, again, to his Cynic ex-student Menedemus. Now it is true

⁷³ [φῆσὶ γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν] ἄνθρωπον φακὴν οὐκ ἂν | ἐψῆσαι τοιαύτην, οἶαν | τε ῥοφωμένην ἡδο-|νὴν παρασχέειν τινὰ | τῷ ῥοφούντι κατὰ | τὴν γεῦσιν ('for he says that the wise man would not cook such a lentil dish as would furnish some sort of gustatory pleasure to the person eating it', T. VI, 12a17–b6).

⁷⁴ οὐκοῦν τοῦτο γε οὐδὲ Μενέδημος | καλῶς ἐδόξαζεν ('so this, at any rate, not even Menedemus was right to believe' – i.e. that the wise man will prepare the lentil soup in a such a way that eating it would produce pleasure).

⁷⁵ Cf. the word *φορτικώτερον* which Colotes uses in this section (T. VI, 12c 8–9) to characterize Zeno's and Menedemus' recommendation of the wise man's austere and humble way of life.

⁷⁶ On the role of the *Euthydemus* for the development of Stoic ethical theory see Long (n. 37) and Mendez and Angeli (n. 1), 82–4.

that among the fragments of the extant text of *Against Plato's Euthydemus* there is no explicit reference to Zeno or the Stoa in general, but only a reference to Menedemus (the Cynic); even so one wonders whether, in discussing the Platonic passage that anticipated Stoic theory, Colotes did in reality intend to attack not just the Socratic view on wisdom and happiness found in the *Euthydemus*, but also the contemporary version of it as propounded by the Hellenistic heirs of Socratic ethics, the Cynics and the Stoics.

Secondly, the main topic at issue in the surviving specimen of Colotes' criticism of the representatives of the Cynic-Stoic persuasion was, rather unsurprisingly, a topic central to Hellenistic ethics: the right way to live a happy life. In particular, Colotes seems to have found fault with the ideas that a) happiness is *exclusively* a matter of being wise and exercising wisdom (i.e. acting in the right way) in any given situation, and b) being wise, and therefore happy, means leading a life of extreme asceticism, self-mastery and frugality. Once again, though, the interesting thing to note is that as far as the extant text allows us to judge, Colotes seems to have taken the Cynics and the Stoics as representing, perhaps with slight differences, the same philosophical tradition going back to the image of Socrates in the early Platonic dialogues. Finally, the reason for Colotes' disagreement with the Cynic-Stoic ethical ideal was, of course, the Epicurean commitment to pleasure as the key to happiness; and though the Epicureans would accept that wisdom and virtue are necessary for happiness, in contrast to the Stoics they would certainly not concede that wisdom and virtue just by themselves constitute happiness.

IV. CONCLUSION

On the basis of the preceding discussion, it is now, I think, possible to draw some conclusions in response to the questions raised at the very beginning.

First, with regard to the extent of the Epicurean polemic against the Stoics, it transpires that, apart from a few references to the Stoics found among the testimonies for Epicurus, a couple of dubious passages deriving from Metrodorus' *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* and Hermarchus' *Πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα*, a title of an anti-Stoic work by Polyaeus and, above all, the fragments of Colotes preserved in Herculanean papyri, there is no other obvious trace of anti-Stoic polemic by early Epicureans. Idomeneus, Carneiscus and Polystratus, the other three Epicureans of the first generation, do not appear to have openly dealt with the Stoic school (at least not in what remains of their writings). One may thus be tempted to conclude that, on the basis of the evidence available to date, the early Epicureans do not seem to have openly engaged in systematic debates with the Stoics. In fact, one wonders whether even the more obvious traces of anti-Stoic polemics, namely Polyaeus' writing against Ariston and Colotes' attack on Zeno and Menedemus the Cynic, are to be explained as one-off cases, rather than as instances of a systematic Epicurean preoccupation with the Stoa. After all, Polyaeus was writing in response to Ariston's attack on Metrodorus, while Colotes' critique seems to have been triggered by a personal feud with Menedemus following the latter's defection to the Cynics.

Now as far as the main points of the controversy are concerned, the extant evidence suggests that whatever specimens of early Epicurean criticism of contemporary Stoics we have, these are predominantly ethical in orientation. So Colotes

ridiculed the Cynic–Stoic sage’s preoccupation with wisdom and austerity. Judging from Philodemus’ testimony, Polyaenus’ critique of Ariston of Chios must have been concerned with questions about religion and the gods.⁷⁷ Even the few dubious early Epicurean references to the Stoa were all concerned with ethics too: ἀλυσία, involvement in public life and the origins of justice and homicide law were the issues raised in the relevant fragments of Epicurus, Metrodorus and Hermarchus.

So what do the remaining testimonies tell us about the early Epicurean perception of and attitude towards the Stoa? Based first of all on Colotes’ fragments, one can conclude that in the eyes of an early Epicurean, Zeno and the early Stoics must have been very closely associated with the Cynics and the Socratic tradition. Further support for this conclusion is to be found in the fact that the only early Epicurean writing openly targeting a Stoic, which is known to date, namely Polyaenus’ *Against Ariston*, was directed against Ariston of Chios, perhaps the most ‘Cynic’ of the early Stoics. It is thus plausible to suggest that one reason why the early Epicureans appear to have neglected the Stoics in their polemical literature is that they probably considered the Stoa as essentially no different from a version of a Socratic ethical sect very much like, if not identical with, the Cynics; and hence they may well have included the early Stoa in their criticisms of the Socratic tradition and its ‘by-products’. Such a perception of the early Stoa by the first-generation Epicureans was not historically unjustified: as already suggested, there is a known affiliation between the founder of the Stoa, Zeno, and the Cynics; Ariston of Chios was recognizably Cynic in his primarily ethical orientation; and of course Socrates was to become the *exemplum philosophiae* for the Stoic school right up to the time of Roman Stoicism and Epictetus. It is worth noting here that according to an Epicurean, Philodemus (*De Stoicis* XIII Dorandi), the Stoics ‘are willing also to be called Socratics’. On the other hand, it might well have suited the Epicurean polemical strategies to emphasize this Socratic–Cynic aspect of Stoicism: by treating the Stoics as no more than yet another branch of Socratic ethics, that is, yet another version of the traditional philosophy, they could promote Epicureanism as the only truly new and original philosophical option.

However, as the Stoic school developed over time and especially under the headship of Chrysippus, when various aspects of Stoic doctrine were laid out more systematically and areas other than ethics (for example, logic) were advanced, Epicurean criticism of the Stoa changed focus, and found fresh vigour too. As the specimens of anti-Stoic polemic by representatives of the late Epicurean school testify (mainly through Philodemus), the target is not so much the Cynicizing Socratic ethics of the early Stoa, but the ‘hard-core’ Stoic doctrine on issues of logic, epistemology and theology.⁷⁸

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⁷⁷ Given Ariston’s rejection of physics and dialectic and his focus on ethics, we might assume that his critique on Epicurean religion, to which Polyaenus responded through his *Against Ariston*, was ethically orientated.

⁷⁸ A version of this paper was presented at the Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford in March 2008; I wish to thank Professor Terry Irwin and Professor David Charles for inviting me to take part and the participants for their feedback. I am very grateful to Professor David Sedley, Professor Chris Pelling, Dr Voula Kotzia and the anonymous referee for reading and generously commenting on earlier versions; needless to say, all remaining errors are my own. Finally, I am indebted to the British Academy for providing me with a post-doctoral fellowship during which this paper was written.